| Authors |
Engelberg, Gao, Parsons |
| Journal |
Journal of Financial Economics |
| Year |
2012 |
| Type |
Published Paper |
| Abstract |
When banks and firms are connected through interpersonal linkages - such as their respective management having attended college or previously worked together - interest rates are markedly reduced, comparable with single shifts in credit ratings. These rate concessions do not appear to reflect sweetheart deals. Subsequent firm performance, such as future credit ratings or stock returns, improves following a connected deal, suggesting that social networks lead to either better information flow or better monitoring. |
| Keywords |
Asymmetric information, bank lending, cost of debt, social connections, lending outcomes |
| URL |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.08.003 |
| Tags |
Archival Empirical |
Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency |
Investment Decisions (Institutional) |
Manager / Firm Behavior |
Social Network Structure
|