Private communication between managers and financial analysts: evidence from taxi ride patterns in New York city
| Authors | Choy, Hope |
| Year | 2021 |
| Type | Working Paper |
| Abstract | This study constructs a novel measure that aims to capture face-to-face private communications between firm managers and sell-side analysts by mapping detailed, large-volume taxi trip records from New York City to the GPS coordinates of companies and brokerages. Consistent with earnings releases prompting needs for private communications, we observe that daily taxi ride volumes between companies and brokerages increase significantly around earnings announcement dates (EAD) and reach their peak on EAD. After controlling for an extensive set of fixed effects (firm, analyst, and year) and other potential confounding factors, we find that increases in ride volumes around EAD are negatively associated with analysts' earnings forecast errors in periods after EAD and positively associated with the profitability of recommendations issued after EAD (but these effects dissipate over longer horizons). Our results suggest that analysts may obtain a private source of information orthogonal to their pre-existing information from these in-person meetings, which may help them better understand the implications of current earnings signals for future earnings. |
| Keywords | private communications, sell-side analysts, taxis, private information, earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, profitability of stock recommendations, earnings announcements, reg FD |
| URL | https://ssrn.com/abstract=3920680 |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Manager / Firm Behavior |
Similarity breeds trust: Political homophily and CEO-board communication
| Authors | Dasgupta, Guo, Ren, Shu |
| Year | 2021 |
| Type | Working Paper |
| Abstract | We find evidence suggesting that similarity of political views between the CEO and independent directors ("political homophily") encourages the CEO to share adverse information with the board. Firms with higher political homophily have lower stock price crash risk, are more likely to divest previously acquired assets with poor announcement returns, and are more likely to recognize losses in asset value. Furthermore, the effect of political homophily is complemented by strong shareholder governance which prevents friendly board from insulating the CEO in the case of ex post negative outcomes. Our identification utilizes the exogenous variation in political beliefs associated with the entry of a conservative television network in local markets. Our findings show that a friendly board facilitates CEO-board communication which is crucial for the board to function effectively in its advisory role. |
| Keywords | Friendly board, CEO-board communication, political homophily, crash risk, corporate governance |
| URL | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3966173&dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_behavioral:experimental:finance:(editor%27s:choice):ejournal_abstractlink |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency | Manager / Firm Behavior | Social Network Structure |
Waiting on a friend: Strategic learning and corporate investment
| Authors | Decaire, Wittry |
| Year | 2021 |
| Type | Working Paper |
| Abstract | Using detailed project-level data, we document a novel mechanism through which information externalities distort investment. Firms anticipate information spillover from peers' investment decisions and delay project exercise to learn from their peers' outcomes. To establish a causal interpretation of our results, we exploit local exogenous variation from the 1800s that shapes the number of peers that a firm can learn from today. The strategic learning incentive is most salient for projects with uncertain profitability, when peers' underlying assets are similar, and in environments where peers are skilled. Finally, our results suggest that the anticipation of peer information dampens aggregate investment. |
| Keywords | Real options, strategic interactions, learning, peer behavior, investment, historical data |
| URL | https://ssrn.com/abstract=3923811 |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Manager / Firm Behavior |
A theory of financial media
| Authors | Goldman, Martel, Schneemeier |
| Journal | Journal of Financial Economics |
| Year | 2021 |
| Type | Published Paper |
| Abstract | We present a model of media coverage of corporate announcements. Firms strategically use the media to communicate corporate announcements to a group of traders who observe announcements not directly but through media reports. Journalists strategically select which announcements to report to readers. Media coverage inadvertently incentivizes firms to manipulate the underlying announcements. In equilibrium, media coverage is tilted towards less manipulated negative news. The presence of financial journalists leads to more manipulation but makes stock prices more informative on average. We provide additional predictions regarding the media's impact on the quality of firm announcements and stock prices. |
| Keywords | financial journalism, disclosure, manipulation, price quality |
| URL | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.038 |
| Tags | Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency | Manager / Firm Behavior | Media and Textual Analysis | Theory |
The salience of entrepreneurship: evidence from online business
| Authors | Huang, Lin, Liu, Manso |
| Year | 2021 |
| Type | Working Paper |
| Abstract | We study the psychological bias underlying the decision to become an entrepreneur in the online business context. Using entrepreneurs affiliated with Taobao Marketplace, the worldâs largest online shopping platform, as our sample, we find that people who observe the emergence of successful stores in their neighborhood are more likely to become online entrepreneurs. Relying on the Taobao store rating system and detailed geographical information for identification, we find that in rural areas of China, an increase in the online rating (upgrade event) of a store leads to a significant increase in the number of new stores within a 0.5-km radius. This effect increases with the magnitude of the upgrade event, decreases with physical distance from the focal store and is robust to a wide range of rigorous model specifications. However, such decisions to enter the market may be suboptimal, as entrants whose entrepreneurs are motivated by these upgrade events underperform relative to their peers in terms of sales and have a higher probability of market exit. Overall, our results are most consistent with salience theories of choice and cannot be explained by regional development or rational learning. |
| Keywords | entrepreneurship, peer effect, salience theory, availability heuristic |
| URL | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3843524 |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Consumer Decisions | Manager / Firm Behavior |
The impact of restricting labor mobility on corporate investment and entrepreneurship
| Authors | Jeffers |
| Year | 2021 |
| Type | Working Paper |
| Abstract | This paper examines how labor frictions affect investment rate and new firm entry. Using matched employee-employer data from LinkedIn, I first show that increases in the enforceability of non-compete agreements lead to widespread declines in employee departures across seniority levels, driven by workers in knowledge-intensive occupations. Investment rates at existing firms increase, especially for firms that employ more skilled workers. This comes at the expense of new firm entry, which declines substantially in knowledge-intensive sectors. The results suggest that labor frictions play an important role in investment decisions, and that NCs may factor into slowing business dynamism. |
| Keywords | Labor mobility, entrepreneurship, investment, non-competes, human capital |
| URL | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3040393 |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Investment Decisions (Institutional) | Manager / Firm Behavior | Media and Textual Analysis |
Does common ownership really increase firm coordination?
| Authors | Lewellen, Lowry |
| Journal | Journal of Financial Economics |
| Year | 2021 |
| Type | Published Paper |
| Abstract | A growing number of studies suggest that common ownership caused cooperation among firms to increase and competition to decrease. We take a closer look at four approaches used to identify these effects. We find that the effects that some studies have attributed to common ownership are caused by other factors, such as differential responses of firms (or industries) to the 2008 financial crisis. We propose a modification to one of the previously used empirical approaches that is less sensitive to these issues. Using this to re-evaluate the link between common ownership and firm outcomes, we find little robust evidence that common ownership affects firm behavior. |
| Keywords | Common ownership, institutional ownership, corporate governance |
| URL | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X21000982 |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Manager / Firm Behavior |
CEO social media presence and insider trading
| Authors | Li, Liang, Tang |
| Year | 2021 |
| Type | Working Paper |
| Abstract | Prior research finds that online social media usage may lower self-control and encourage indulgent behavior in laboratory subjects. We find that corporate CEOs show similar tendencies: CEOs with online social media presence are more likely to succumb to lower self-control and abuse their information advantage to profit from unethical insider trades. Specifically, CEOs' social media presence strongly predicts their insider trading activity in terms of incidence, intensity (amount and frequency), and profitability. We further find that the effect is driven by insider buys (not by sells) and is more pronounced for opportunistic buys which tend to contain more material non-public information. |
| Keywords | Insider trading, social media, CEO misconduct, business ethics |
| URL | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3909886&dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_behavioral:experimental:finance:(editor%27s:choice):ejournal_abstractlink |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency | Manager / Firm Behavior | Propagation of Noise / Undesirable Outcomes | Social Network Structure |
CEO social media presence and insider trading
| Authors | Li, Liang,Tang |
| Year | 2021 |
| Type | Working Paper |
| Abstract | Prior research finds that online social media usage may lower self-control and encourage indulgent behavior in laboratory subjects. We find that corporate CEOs show similar tendencies: CEOs with online social media presence are more likely to succumb to lower self-control and abuse their information advantage to profit from unethical insider trades. Specifically, CEOs' social media presence strongly predicts their insider trading activity in terms of incidence, intensity (amount and frequency), and profitability. We further find that the effect is driven by insider buys (not by sells) and is more pronounced for opportunistic buys which tend to contain more material non-public information. |
| Keywords | insider trading, social media, CEO misconduct, business ethics |
| URL | https://ssrn.com/abstract=3909886 |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Manager / Firm Behavior | Media and Textual Analysis |
The politics of management earnings expectations
| Authors | Liu, Na, Nagar, Yan |
| Year | 2021 |
| Type | Working Paper |
| Abstract | This study documents that CEOsâ expectations about firm performance are more negatively biased in periods when the White House is governed by the political party that the CEOs did not contribute to, relative to periods when the White House is occupied by the CEOsâ party. This negative bias holds as strongly toward the end of the year, suggesting that CEOs do not revise their priors in response to new information. The results are stronger for firms whose performance is more correlated with the general economic conditions, consistent with managersâ biased beliefs about the economy driving the results. Upon facing an opposing presidency, the sensitivity of CEOsâ capital investments to cash flow decreases, relative to their politically aligned years. By contrast, actual firm performance is largely unaffected. Overall, our results highlight the importance of political partisan bias in shaping managersâ expectations about firm performance. |
| Keywords | Managerial Biases, Partisan Conflict, Earnings Expectations, CEO Earnings Forecasts |
| URL | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3950975&dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_capital:markets:market:efficiency:ejournal_abstractlink |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Manager / Firm Behavior |
CEO partisan bias and management earnings forecast bias
| Authors | Stuart, Wang, Willis |
| Year | 2021 |
| Type | Working Paper |
| Abstract | Political science research finds that individuals exhibit partisan bias, which results in unduly favorable economic expectations when their partisanship aligns with that of the US president. We examine whether partisan bias is present in management earnings forecasts, where CEOs have strong incentives to provide high-quality forecasts. We find that firms with CEOs whose partisanship aligns with that of the US president issue more optimistically biased management earnings forecasts than CEOs whose partisanship is unknown or not aligned with that of the US president. Our results suggest that CEOs fall prey to partisan bias, which results in suboptimal forecasting behavior. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that this forecast over-optimism is attenuated when CEOs are of higher ability. Additionally, we find that investors fail to discount the news in forecasts issued by CEOs whose partisanship aligns with that of the US president and that post-forecast abnormal returns are lower for these firms. |
| Keywords | Political bias, cognitive bias, management earnings forecasts, voluntary disclosure |
| URL | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2902088 |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency | Manager / Firm Behavior |
Entrepreneurial spillovers across coworkers
| Authors | Wallskog |
| Year | 2021 |
| Type | Working Paper |
| Abstract | Using large-scale administrative data, I track the employment and entrepreneurship of over forty million Americans and investigate entrepreneurial spillovers across coworkers, based on the idea that individuals who start their own firms learn institutional knowledge and entrepreneurial skills that they may teach others. I find that an individual whose current coworkers have more prior entrepreneurship experience is more likely to become an entrepreneur themself within the next five years, and these spillovers are strongest among workers with similar jobs and demographics. Furthermore, an individual is more likely to become a successful entrepreneur if those coworkers were themselves successful entrepreneurs. To quantify the role of these spillovers, I build a structural model of entrepreneurship and learning and estimate that the aggregate entrepreneurship rate would be 10% lower in the absence of learning. |
| URL | https://wallskog.su.domains/files/wallskog_jmp.pdf |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Manager / Firm Behavior | Productivity Spillovers |
To be or not to be your authentic self? Catering to others' preferences hinders performance
| Authors | Gino, Sezer, Huanga |
| Journal | Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes |
| Year | 2020 |
| Type | Published Paper |
| Abstract | When approaching interpersonal first meetings (e.g., job interviews), people often cater to the target's interests and expectations to make a good impression and secure a positive outcome such as being offered the job (pilot study). This strategy is distinct from other approaches identified in prior impression management research (Studies 1A, 1B and 1C), and does not produce the benefits people expect. In a field study in which entrepreneurs pitched their ideas to potential investors (Study 2), catering harmed investors' evaluations, while being authentic improved them. People experience greater anxiety and instrumentality when they cater to another person's preferences than when they behave authentically (Studies 3A and 3B). Compared to behaving authentically or to a control condition, catering harms performance because trying to anticipate and fulfill others' preferences feels instrumental and increases anxiety (Studies 4 and 5). Taken together, these results suggest that although people believe using catering in interpersonal first meetings will lead to successful outcomes, the opposite is true: catering creates undesirable feelings of instrumentality for the caterer, increases anxiety, and ultimately hinders performance. |
| Keywords | Authenticity, catering, honesty, selection, anxiety, impression management |
| URL | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2020.01.003 |
| Tags | Experimental / Survey-Based Empirical | Investment Decisions (Institutional) | Manager / Firm Behavior | Social Transmission Biases |
Presidential address: Social transmission bias in economics and finance
| Authors | Hirshleifer |
| Journal | Journal of Finance |
| Year | 2020 |
| Type | Published Paper |
| Abstract | I discuss a new intellectual paradigm, social economics and finance--the study of the social processes that shape economic thinking and behavior. This emerging field recognizes that people observe and talk to each other. A key, underexploited building block of social economics and finance is social transmission bias: systematic directional shift in signals or ideas induced by social transactions. I use five "fables" (models) to illustrate the novelty and scope of the transmission bias approach, and offer several emergent themes. For example, social transmission bias compounds recursively, which can help explain booms, bubbles, return anomalies, and swings in economic sentiment. |
| Keywords | Social transmission bias, social economics, social finance, behavioral economics, behavioral finance, social networks, social learning, information percolation, biased percolation, epidemiology, visibility bias, self-enhancing transmission bias, simplistic thinking, memes, cultural evolution |
| URL | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/jofi.12906 |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency | Evolutionary Finance | Experimental / Survey-Based Empirical | Financing- and Investment Decisions (Individual) | Investment Decisions (Institutional) | Manager / Firm Behavior | Media and Textual Analysis | Propagation of Noise / Undesirable Outcomes | Social Transmission Biases | Theory |
Behavioral and social corporate finance
| Authors | Cronqvist, Pely |
| Book | Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance |
| Year | 2019 |
| Type | Book | Literature Review Paper |
| Abstract | Corporate finance is about understanding the determinants and consequences of the investment and financing policies of corporations. In a standard neoclassical profit maximization framework, rational agents, that is, managers, make corporate finance decisions on behalf of rational principals, that is, shareholders. Over the past two decades, there has been a rapidly growing interest in augmenting standard finance frameworks with novel insights from cognitive psychology, and more recently, social psychology and sociology. This emerging subfield in finance research has been dubbed behavioral corporate finance, which differentiates between rational and behavioral agents and principals. The presence of behavioral shareholders, that is, principals, may lead to market timing and catering behavior by rational managers. Such managers will opportunistically time the market and exploit mispricing by investing capital, issuing securities, or borrowing debt when costs of capital are low and shunning equity, divesting assets, repurchasing securities, and paying back debt when costs of capital are high. Rational managers will also incite mispricing, for example, cater to non-standard preferences of shareholders through earnings management or by transitioning their firms into an in-fashion category to boost the stock's price. The interaction of behavioral managers, that is, agents, with rational shareholders can also lead to distortions in corporate decision making. For example, managers may perceive fundamental values differently and systematically diverge from optimal decisions. Several personal traits, for example, overconfidence or narcissism, and environmental factors, for example, fatal natural disasters, shape behavioral managers' preferences and beliefs, short or long term. These factors may bias the value perception by managers and thus lead to inferior decision making. An extension of behavioral corporate finance is social corporate finance, where agents and principals do not make decisions in a vacuum but rather are embedded in a dynamic social environment. Since managers and shareholders take a social position within and across markets, social psychology and sociology can be useful to understand how social traits, states, and activities shape corporate decision making if an individual's psychology is not directly observable. |
| Keywords | behavioral finance, social finance, corporate finance, market efficiency, cognitive biases, limits of arbitrage, limits of governance |
| URL | https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190625979.013.427 |
| Tags | Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency | Investment Decisions (Institutional) | Manager / Firm Behavior | Propagation of Noise / Undesirable Outcomes | Social Network Structure | Social Transmission Biases | Theory |
Corporate culture as an implicit contract
| Authors | Jeffers, Lee |
| Year | 2019 |
| Type | Working Paper |
| Abstract | We develop a measure of corporate culture using coworker connectivity on LinkedIn's platform, and show it is strongly correlated with positive employee relations and satisfaction. Using state-level changes to employment agreements as shocks to explicit contracts, we find that these changes significantly impact employees in weakly connected firms, but have little to no effect on those at strongly connected firms. Our results suggest that firms with strong corporate culture are less dependent on explicit contracts to retain human capital. We document implications for firms' investment decisions and other outcomes. |
| Keywords | Corporate culture, human capital, implicit contracts, non-competes |
| URL | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3426060 |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Investment Decisions (Institutional) | Manager / Firm Behavior | Media and Textual Analysis | Social Network Structure |
The self-presentational consequences of upholding one's stance in spite of the evidence
| Authors | John, Jeong, Gino, Huang |
| Journal | Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes |
| Year | 2019 |
| Type | Published Paper |
| Abstract | Five studies explore the self-presentational consequences of refusing to "back down" -- that is, upholding a stance despite evidence of its inaccuracy. Using data from an entrepreneurial pitch competition, Study 1 shows that entrepreneurs tend not to back down even though investors are more impressed by entrepreneurs who do. Next, in two sets of experiments, we unpack the psychology underlying why actors refuse to publicly back down and investigate observers' impressions of those actors. Specifically, we show that observers view people who refuse to back down as confident but unintelligent, and these perceptions drive consequential decisions about such refusers, such as whether to invest in their ideas (Studies 1 & 2) or whether to hire them (Study 3). Although actors can intuit these effects (Study 4), this understanding is not reflected in their behavior because they are concerned with saving face (Study 5). |
| Keywords | Self-presentation, belief perseverance, judgment, confidence, persuasion |
| URL | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2019.07.001 |
| Tags | Experimental / Survey-Based Empirical | Investment Decisions (Institutional) | Manager / Firm Behavior | Social Transmission Biases |
Narrative economics: how stories go viral and drive major economic events
| Authors | Shiller |
| Book | Narrative Economics |
| Year | 2019 |
| Type | Book |
| Abstract | Stories people tell-about financial confidence or panic, housing booms, or Bitcoin-can go viral and powerfully affect economies, but such narratives have traditionally been ignored in economics and finance because they seem anecdotal and unscientific. In this groundbreaking book, Robert Shiller explains why we ignore these stories at our peril-and how we can begin to take them seriously. Using a rich array of examples and data, Shiller argues that studying popular stories that influence individual and collective economic behavior-what he calls "narrative economics"-may vastly improve our ability to predict, prepare for, and lessen the damage of financial crises and other major economic events. The result is nothing less than a new way to think about the economy, economic change, and economics. In a new preface, Shiller reflects on some of the challenges facing narrative economics, discusses the connection between disease epidemics and economic epidemics, and suggests why epidemiology may hold lessons for fighting economic contagions. |
| Keywords | COVID-19, coronavirus, H1N1, Wuhan, Spanish flu, Spanish influenza, influenza, Ebola polio disease, 1918 flu epidemic, Great Recession, 1929 financial epidemic, pandemic, co-epidemic, contagion, market meltdown, stock crash, bubble, panic, epidemiology, world financial crisis, virality, disease, stimulus, fear, bank runs, bank failures, behavioral economics, consumer confidence, crowd psychology, crisis of confidence, crisis, mutation, conspiracy theories, fake news, false narratives, chaos theory, butterfly effect, John Maynard Keynes |
| URL | https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691212074 |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency | Evolutionary Finance | Financing- and Investment Decisions (Individual) | Investment Decisions (Institutional) | Manager / Firm Behavior | Propagation of Noise / Undesirable Outcomes | Social Transmission Biases |
Can Twitter help predict firm-level earnings and stock returns?
| Authors | Bartov, Faurel, Mohanram |
| Journal | The Accounting Review |
| Year | 2018 |
| Type | Published Paper |
| Abstract | Prior research has examined how companies exploit Twitter in communicating with investors, and whether Twitter activity predicts the stock market as a whole. We test whether opinions of individuals tweeted just prior to a firm's earnings announcement predict its earnings and announcement returns. Using a broad sample from 2009 to 2012, we find that the aggregate opinion in individual tweets successfully predicts a firm's forthcoming quarterly earnings and announcement returns. These results hold for tweets that convey original information, as well as tweets that disseminate existing information, and are stronger for tweets providing information directly related to firm fundamentals and stock trading. Importantly, our results hold even after controlling for concurrent information or opinion from traditional media sources, and are stronger for firms in weaker information environments. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the aggregate opinion in individual tweets when assessing stocks' future prospects and value. |
| Keywords | Twitter, social media, wisdom of crowds, earnings, analyst earnings forecast, abnormal stock returns |
| URL | https://publications.aaahq.org/accounting-review/article-abstract/93/3/25/4062/Can-Twitter-Help-Predict-Firm-Level-Earnings-and?redirectedFrom=fulltext |
| Tags | Archival Empirical | Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency | Manager / Firm Behavior | Media and Textual Analysis |
Social and cultural issues in finance
| Authors | Cronqvist |
| Journal | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis |
| Year | 2018 |
| Type | Published Paper | Literature Review Paper |
| Keywords | Social networks, social capital, social preferences, financial decision, asset pricing, corporate governance |
| URL | https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-financial-and-quantitative-analysis/virtual-special-issues/jfqa-virtual-issue-2 |
| Tags | Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency | Financing- and Investment Decisions (Individual) | Investment Decisions (Institutional) | Manager / Firm Behavior | Propagation of Noise / Undesirable Outcomes | Social Network Structure | Social Transmission Biases | Theory |