Social transmission bias and investor behavior

Authors Han, Hirshleifer, Walden
Journal Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year 2021
Type Published Paper
Abstract We offer a new social approach to investment decision making and asset prices. Investors discuss their strategies and convert others to their strategies with a probability that increases in investment returns. The conversion rate is shown to be convex in realized returns. Unconditionally, active strategies (e.g., high variance and skewness) dominate, although investors have no inherent preference for these characteristics. The model has strong predictions for how the adoption of active strategies depends on investors's social networks. In contrast with nonsocial approaches, sociability, self-enhancing transmission, and other features of the communication process determine the popularity and pricing of active investment strategies.
URL https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109021000077
Tags Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency  |   Financing- and Investment Decisions (Individual)  |   Investment Decisions (Institutional)  |   Social Transmission Biases  |   Theory

Game on: Social networks and markets

Authors Pedersen
Year 2021
Type Working Paper
Abstract I present closed-form solutions for prices, portfolios, and beliefs in a model where four types of investors trade assets over time: naive investors who learn via a social network, "fanatics" possibly spreading fake news, rational short-term investors, and long-term investors. I show that fanatic and rational views dominate over time due to echo-chamber effects, and their relative importance depends on their following by influencers. Securities markets exhibit social network spillovers, large effects of influencers and thought leaders, bubbles, bursts of high volume, price momentum, fundamental momentum, and reversal. The model sheds new light on the GameStop event, historical bubbles, and asset markets more generally.
Keywords Echo chambers, networks, influencers, fake news, social media, bubbles, asset prices, belief formation
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3794616
Tags Financing- and Investment Decisions (Individual)  |   Propagation of Noise / Undesirable Outcomes  |   Social Network Structure  |   Theory

Community membership and reciprocity in lending: Evidence from informal markets

Authors Tomy, Moerman
Year 2021
Type Working Paper
Abstract We study how wholesalers assess credit risk and extend trade credit to retailers in informal economies where market institutions, such as financial reporting systems, auditing, and courts, are nonexistent or function poorly. Using the setting of a large market in India, we find that community membership plays a strong role in the access to credit. Wholesalers are more likely to provide trade credit and to offer less restrictive credit terms to within-community retailers, and are more lenient when these retailers default. Our findings suggest that an indirect reciprocity mechanism explains within-community credit flows, as evidenced by wholesalers with low endowments, those with greater within-community information flows about them, and those facing income shocks being more likely to provide preferential lending to their community retailers. The importance of the indirect reciprocity mechanism is further supported by evidence on the help traders receive from their community members following the COVID-19-related income shock.
Keywords Trade credit, informal economies, lending, reciprocity, India, Iewduh, community enforcement, asymmetric information
URL https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3773160&dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_chicago:booth:famamiller:working:paper:series_abstractlink
Tags Archival Empirical  |   Theory

Presidential address: Social transmission bias in economics and finance

Authors Hirshleifer
Journal Journal of Finance
Year 2020
Type Published Paper
Abstract I discuss a new intellectual paradigm, social economics and finance--the study of the social processes that shape economic thinking and behavior. This emerging field recognizes that people observe and talk to each other. A key, underexploited building block of social economics and finance is social transmission bias: systematic directional shift in signals or ideas induced by social transactions. I use five "fables" (models) to illustrate the novelty and scope of the transmission bias approach, and offer several emergent themes. For example, social transmission bias compounds recursively, which can help explain booms, bubbles, return anomalies, and swings in economic sentiment.
Keywords Social transmission bias, social economics, social finance, behavioral economics, behavioral finance, social networks, social learning, information percolation, biased percolation, epidemiology, visibility bias, self-enhancing transmission bias, simplistic thinking, memes, cultural evolution
URL https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/jofi.12906
Tags Archival Empirical  |   Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency  |   Evolutionary Finance  |   Experimental / Survey-Based Empirical  |   Financing- and Investment Decisions (Individual)  |   Investment Decisions (Institutional)  |   Manager / Firm Behavior  |   Media and Textual Analysis  |   Propagation of Noise / Undesirable Outcomes  |   Social Transmission Biases  |   Theory

Behavioral and social corporate finance

Authors Cronqvist, Pely
Book Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance
Year 2019
Type Book | Literature Review Paper
Abstract Corporate finance is about understanding the determinants and consequences of the investment and financing policies of corporations. In a standard neoclassical profit maximization framework, rational agents, that is, managers, make corporate finance decisions on behalf of rational principals, that is, shareholders. Over the past two decades, there has been a rapidly growing interest in augmenting standard finance frameworks with novel insights from cognitive psychology, and more recently, social psychology and sociology. This emerging subfield in finance research has been dubbed behavioral corporate finance, which differentiates between rational and behavioral agents and principals. The presence of behavioral shareholders, that is, principals, may lead to market timing and catering behavior by rational managers. Such managers will opportunistically time the market and exploit mispricing by investing capital, issuing securities, or borrowing debt when costs of capital are low and shunning equity, divesting assets, repurchasing securities, and paying back debt when costs of capital are high. Rational managers will also incite mispricing, for example, cater to non-standard preferences of shareholders through earnings management or by transitioning their firms into an in-fashion category to boost the stock's price. The interaction of behavioral managers, that is, agents, with rational shareholders can also lead to distortions in corporate decision making. For example, managers may perceive fundamental values differently and systematically diverge from optimal decisions. Several personal traits, for example, overconfidence or narcissism, and environmental factors, for example, fatal natural disasters, shape behavioral managers' preferences and beliefs, short or long term. These factors may bias the value perception by managers and thus lead to inferior decision making. An extension of behavioral corporate finance is social corporate finance, where agents and principals do not make decisions in a vacuum but rather are embedded in a dynamic social environment. Since managers and shareholders take a social position within and across markets, social psychology and sociology can be useful to understand how social traits, states, and activities shape corporate decision making if an individual's psychology is not directly observable.
Keywords behavioral finance, social finance, corporate finance, market efficiency, cognitive biases, limits of arbitrage, limits of governance
URL https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190625979.013.427
Tags Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency  |   Investment Decisions (Institutional)  |   Manager / Firm Behavior  |   Propagation of Noise / Undesirable Outcomes  |   Social Network Structure  |   Social Transmission Biases  |   Theory

Visibility bias in the transmission of consumption beliefs and undersaving

Authors Han, Hirshleifer, Walden
Year 2019
Type Working Paper
Abstract We model visibility bias in the social transmission of consumption behavior. When consumption is more salient than non-consumption, people perceive that others are consuming heavily, and infer that future prospects are favorable. This increases aggregate consumption in a positive feedback loop. A distinctive implication is that disclosure policy interventions can ameliorate undersaving. In contrast with wealth-signaling models, information asymmetry about wealth reduces overconsumption. The model predicts that saving is influenced by social connectedness, observation biases, and demographic structure; and provides a novel explanation for the dramatic drop in savings rates in the US and several other countries in recent decades.
URL https://www.nber.org/papers/w25566
Tags Propagation of Noise / Undesirable Outcomes  |   Social Transmission Biases  |   Theory

News media and delegated information choice

Authors Nimark, Pitschner
Journal Journal of Economic Theory
Year 2019
Type Published Paper
Abstract No agent has the resources to monitor all events that are potentially relevant for his decisions. Therefore, many delegate their information choice to specialized news providers that monitor the world on their behalf and report only a curated selection of events. We document empirically that, while different outlets typically emphasize different topics, major events shift the general news focus and make coverage more homogeneous. We propose a theoretical framework that formalizes this type of state-dependent editorial behavior by introducing news selection functions. We prove that (i) agents can always reduce the entropy of their posterior beliefs by delegating their information choice, (ii) state-dependent reporting conveys information not only via the contents of a story, but also via the decision of what to report, and (iii) an event that is reported by all news providers is common knowledge among agents only if it is also considered maximally newsworthy by all providers. As an application, we embed delegated news selection into a simple beauty-contest model to demonstrate how it affects actions in a setting with strategic interactions.
Keywords news media, delegated information choice, latent dirichlet allocation, common knowledge, strategic games, beauty contest
URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.02.001
Tags Media and Textual Analysis  |   Theory

From extreme to mainstream: How social norms unravel

Authors Bursztyn, Egorov, Fiorin
Year 2018
Type Working Paper
Abstract Social norms are typically thought to be persistent and long-lasting, sometimes surviving through growth, recessions, and regime changes. In some cases, however, they can quickly change. This paper examines the unraveling of social norms in communication when new information becomes available, e.g., aggregated through elections. We build a model of strategic communication between citizens who can hold one of two mutually exclusive opinions. In our model, agents communicate their opinions to each other, and senders care about receivers' approval. As a result, senders are more likely to express the more popular opinion, while receivers make less inference about senders who stated the popular view. We test these predictions using two experiments. In the main experiment, we identify the causal effect of Donald Trump's rise in political popularity on individuals' willingness to publicly express xenophobic views. Participants in the experiment are offered a bonus reward if they authorize researchers to make a donation to an anti-immigration organization on their behalf. Participants who expect their decision to be observed by the surveyor are significantly less likely to accept the offer than those expecting an anonymous choice. Increases in participants' perceptions of Trump's popularity (either through experimental variation or through the "natural experiment" of his victory) eliminate the wedge between private and public behavior. A second experiment uses dictator games to show that participants judge a person less negatively for publicly expressing (but not for privately holding) a political view they disagree with if that person's social environment is one where the majority of people holds that view.
Keywords Social communication, belief updates, experiment
URL https://www.nber.org/papers/w23415
Tags Experimental / Survey-Based Empirical  |   Social Network Structure  |   Theory

Social and cultural issues in finance

Authors Cronqvist
Journal Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year 2018
Type Published Paper | Literature Review Paper
Keywords Social networks, social capital, social preferences, financial decision, asset pricing, corporate governance
URL https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-financial-and-quantitative-analysis/virtual-special-issues/jfqa-virtual-issue-2
Tags Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency  |   Financing- and Investment Decisions (Individual)  |   Investment Decisions (Institutional)  |   Manager / Firm Behavior  |   Propagation of Noise / Undesirable Outcomes  |   Social Network Structure  |   Social Transmission Biases  |   Theory

What happens in vegas stays on TripAdvisor? A theory and technique to understand narrativity in consumer reviews

Authors Laer, Escalas, Ludwig, Hende
Journal Journal of Consumer Research
Year 2018
Type Published Paper
Abstract Many consumers base their purchase decisions on online consumer reviews. An overlooked feature of these texts is their narrativity: the extent to which they tell a story. The authors construct a new theory of narrativity to link the narrative content and discourse of consumer reviews to consumer behavior. They also develop from scratch a computerized technique that reliably determines the degree of narrativity of 190,461 verbatim, online consumer reviews and validate the automated text analysis with two controlled experiments. More transporting (i.e., engaging) and persuasive reviews have better-developed characters and events as well as more emotionally changing genres and dramatic event orders. This interdisciplinary, multimethod research should help future researchers (1) predict how narrativity affects consumers' narrative transportation and persuasion, (2) measure the narrativity of large digital corpora of textual data, and (3) understand how this important linguistic feature varies along a continuum.
Keywords Automated text analysis, computational linguistics, consumer reviews, narrative persuasion, narrative transportation, storytelling
URL https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucy067
Tags Archival Empirical  |   Consumer Decisions  |   Media and Textual Analysis  |   Theory

The geography of financial misconduct

Authors Parsons, Sulaeman, Titman
Journal Journal of Finance
Year 2018
Type Published Paper
Abstract Financial misconduct (FM) rates differ widely between major U.S. cities, up to a factor of 3. Although spatial differences in enforcement and firm characteristics do not account for these patterns, city-level norms appear to be very important. For example, FM rates are strongly related to other unethical behavior, involving politicians, doctors, and (potentially unfaithful) spouses, in the city.
Keywords Corporate corruption, financial misconduct, peer effects, political fraud, white collar misconduct
URL https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12704
Tags Archival Empirical  |   Manager / Firm Behavior  |   Theory

Social screens and systematic investor boycott risk

Authors Luo, Balvers
Journal Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year 2017
Type Published Paper
Abstract We model the pricing implications of screens adopted by socially responsible investors. The model reproduces the empirically observed abnormal return to sin stock and implies a premium for systematic investor boycott risk that affects targeted as well as nontargeted firms. The investor boycott premium is not displaced by litigation risk, measures of neglect effect, illiquidity, industry momentum, or concentration. The investor boycott risk factor is useful in explaining mean returns across industries, and its premium varies with the relative wealth of socially responsible investors and the business cycle.
Keywords Socially responsible investing, sin stocks, boycott risk premium, stock returns
URL https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109016000910
Tags Archival Empirical  |   Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency  |   Financing- and Investment Decisions (Individual)  |   Theory

Social networks and parental behavior in the intergenerational transmission of religion

Authors Patacchini, Zenou
Journal Quantitative Economics
Year 2016
Type Published Paper
Abstract We analyze the intergenerational transmission of the strength of religion focusing on the interplay between family and social influences. We find that parental investment in transmitting religious values and peers' religiousity are complements. The relative importance of these socialization factors depends on the religiosity of the parents.
Keywords Religion, cultural transmission, social networks
URL https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/QE506
Tags Archival Empirical  |   Social Network Structure  |   Theory

Suspense and surprise

Authors Ely, Frankel, Kamenica
Journal Journal of Political Economy
Year 2015
Type Published Paper
Abstract We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period's beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period's belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise experienced by a Bayesian audience. We apply our results to the design of mystery novels, political primaries, casinos, game shows, auctions, and sports.
URL https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/677350
Tags Consumer Decisions  |   Financing- and Investment Decisions (Individual)  |   Investment Decisions (Institutional)  |   Manager / Firm Behavior  |   Social Transmission Biases  |   Theory

The price of a CEO's rolodex

Authors Engelberg, Gao, Parsons
Journal Review of Financial Studies
Year 2013
Type Published Paper
Abstract CEOs with large networks earn more than those with small networks. An additional connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases compensation by about $17,000 on average, more so for "important" members, such as CEOs of big firms. Pay-for-connectivity is unrelated to several measures of corporate governance, evidence in favor of an efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay.
Keywords CEO compensation, social networks, information value, corporate governance
URL https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhs114
Tags Archival Empirical  |   Manager / Firm Behavior  |   Social Network Structure  |   Theory

So you want to run an experiment, now what? Some simple rules of thumb for optimal experimental design

Authors List, Sadoff, Wagner
Journal Experimental Economics
Year 2011
Type Published Paper
Abstract Experimental economics represents a strong growth industry. In the past several decades the method has expanded beyond intellectual curiosity, now meriting consideration alongside the other more traditional empirical approaches used in economics. Accompanying this growth is an influx of new experimenters who are in need of straightforward direction to make their designs more powerful. This study provides several simple rules of thumb that researchers can apply to improve the efficiency of their experimental designs. We buttress these points by including empirical examples from the literature.
Keywords Experimental economics, experimental design, rule of thumb, randomization techniques, optimal sample arrangement
URL https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-011-9275-7
Tags Experimental / Survey-Based Empirical  |   Theory

Trusting the stock market

Authors Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales
Journal Journal of Finance
Year 2008
Type Published Paper
Abstract We study the effect that a general lack of trust can have on stock market participation. In deciding whether to buy stocks, investors factor in the risk of being cheated. The perception of this risk is a function of the objective characteristics of the stocks and the subjective characteristics of the investor. Less trusting individuals are less likely to buy stock and, conditional on buying stock, they will buy less. In Dutch and Italian micro data, as well as in cross-country data, we find evidence consistent with lack of trust being an important factor in explaining the limited participation puzzle.
Keywords Social trust, investment decisions, cultural and demographic differences, risk and ambiguity aversion
URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01408.x
Tags Experimental / Survey-Based Empirical  |   Financing- and Investment Decisions (Individual)  |   Theory

The role of social capital in financial development

Authors Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales
Journal American Economic Review
Year 2004
Type Published Paper
Abstract To identify the effect of social capital on financial development, we exploit social capital differences within Italy. In high-social-capital areas, households are more likely to use checks, invest less in cash and more in stock, have higher access to institutional credit, and make less use of informal credit. The effect of social capital is stronger where legal enforcement is weaker and among less educated people. These results are not driven by omitted environmental variables, since we show that the behavior of movers is still affected by the level of social capital of the province where they were born.
Keywords Household finance, social capital, financial development, education, legal environment
URL https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/0002828041464498
Tags Experimental / Survey-Based Empirical  |   Financing- and Investment Decisions (Individual)  |   Theory

Persuasion bias, social influence, and unidimensional opinions

Authors DeMarzo, Vayanos, Zwiebel
Journal Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year 2003
Type Published Paper
Abstract We propose a boundedly rational model of opinion formation in which individuals are subject to persuasion bias; that is, they fail to account for possible repetition in the information they receive. We show that persuasion bias implies the phenomenon of social influence, whereby one's influence on group opinions depends not only on accuracy, but also on how well-connected one is in the social network that determines communication. Persuasion bias also implies the phenomenon of unidimensional opinions; that is, individuals' opinions over a multidimensional set of issues converge to a single "left-right" spectrum. We explore the implications of our model in several natural settings, including political science and marketing, and we obtain a number of novel empirical implications.
URL https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530360698469
Tags Social Network Structure  |   Social Transmission Biases  |   Theory

The socio-economic dynamics of speculative markets: Interacting agents, chaos, and the fat tails of return distributions

Authors Lux
Journal Journal of economic behavior & organization
Year 1998
Type Published Paper
Abstract This paper develops a model of the social and economic interaction of speculators in a securities or foreign exchange market. Both chartist and fundamentalist strategies are pursued by traders. The formalization of chartists behavior combines elements of mimetic contagion and trend chasing leading to waves of optimism or pessimism. Furthermore, changes of strategies from chartist to fundamentalist behavior and vice versa occur because speculators compare the performance of both strategies. The dynamic system under study encompasses the time development of the distribution of attitudes among traders as well as price adjustment. Chaotic attractors are found within a broad range of parameter values. The distributions of returns derived from chaotic trajectories of the model share important characteristics of empirical data: they exhibit high peaks around the mean as well as fat tails (leptokurtosis) and become less leptokurtotic under time aggregation.
Keywords Herd behavior, bubbles, leptokurtosis
URL https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268197000887
Tags Asset Pricing, Trading Volume and Market Efficiency  |   Financing- and Investment Decisions (Individual)  |   Propagation of Noise / Undesirable Outcomes  |   Social Network Structure  |   Theory

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